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In this issue...
Ontario’s electricity sector is plagued by economic and policy problems
that reflect its hybrid status between regulation and the market. There
are sensible ways out of the quagmire.
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GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONSEconomic and policy problems plague Ontario’s electricity sector six years
after the government’s initial attempt at market liberalization in 2002. Several
changes of direction later, the electricity sector has a hybrid structure of
regulation and market forces, with a central procurement role assigned to the
Ontario Power Authority (OPA). This paper questions whether a central
procurement approach represents the best means of achieving a well-
functioning electricity sector and, if not, what better approach exists.
The author examines how to fashion a cost-effective, reliable electricity system
to bridge the quickly approaching gap between demand and supply. The
system should be able to withstand disturbances and must have adequate
resources  to meet consumers’ power demands at a low cost. Risks — including
the risks associated with fluctuations in fuel prices, technological change or
plant breakdowns — should be distributed to the lowest-cost bearer of such
risks.
The author concludes:
1. There must be counterparties other than the OPA to whom generators can
sell their production on a long-term basis. For example, the government
should embrace the OPA’s calls for establishing load-serving entities or
Customer Entitlement Agents.
2. The government should recognize explicitly that the OPA’s central
procurement mission is transitional and intended to help the sector
migrate to a more competitive market environment.
3. Governance must be improved at Ontario Power Generation (OPG),
which owns and operates the province’s electricity generation, by making
its assets available to the private sector. To ensure good governance and
accountability at the agency responsible for procurement (be it the OPA
or its successors), the government should establish clear performance
objectives and criteria.
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O
ntario’s electricity sector has
undergone a dramatic
transformation in less than a
decade. Under the market
liberalization attempted in 2002,
Ontario expected that the new
climate would stimulate the new
generation investment required to
meet growing demand. But that
optimism proved unfounded. Due to
both idiosyncratic and institutional
factors, the 2002 reforms were met
with volatile electricity prices that
produced public discomfort.
The government responded by constraining the
market and imposing regulations on retail prices
and, later, on wholesale prices. The result of this
and other factors was to stifle private investment
in generation assets. This lack of investment
posed significant political and economic risks,
given the importance of adequate electricity
reserves to a modern, industrial economy.
The province’s next attempt to balance the
supply-demand curve was to engage in central
procurement. Instead of relying on the market to
stimulate investment, it created in 2004 a central
body owned by the government — the Ontario
Power Authority (OPA) — that would determine
the generation required to meet the long-term
needs of the electricity system and conduct
tenders to procure it. This single, publicly owned
entity, rather than a private entity (or a mix of
public and private entities), would act as a
counterparty to generators in order to purchase
their electricity on a long-term basis. 
Today, the OPA typically selects the private
developer submitting the most favourable terms
for new generation, including costs, from among
a number of bidders.1 The authority passes on to
consumers the costs of paying generators for the
electricity they produce under their contracts.
These costs, typically payments for agreeing to
build plants with a certain capacity level and
supply electricity into the grid, are built into the
electricity rates consumers pay to their local
distribution company.2 In its brief existence, the
OPA has contracted with private investors for
over $10.9 billion in new generation investment,
or about 8,300 megawatts in new capacity.3 In the
years ahead, the OPA plans to contract for more
than $60 billion in new investment to facilitate
upgrades to the electricity system.4
There may be changes afoot. A 2007 panel
reviewing Ontario’s energy agencies recommended
that OPA’s procurement function be folded into
another agency — the Independent Electricity
System Operator — to save administrative costs.
However, it did not question the idea of relying
on a central procurement-based approach. The
panel backed that method because “effective and
fully competitive electricity markets have been
slow to develop.”5
This paper questions whether a central
procurement approach represents the best means
of achieving a well-functioning electricity sector
and, if not, what better approach exists. As the
review panel noted, “The challenge for the sector
is clear: Ontario needs a major infrastructure
program that delivers cost-effective resources in a
timely fashion.”
The central question is how to fashion such a
cost-effective, reliable electricity system to bridge
the quickly approaching gap between demand
and supply. The system should be able to
withstand disturbances and must have adequate
resources to meet consumers’ power demands at a
low cost.6 Risks — including the risks associated
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1 See “Integrated Power System Plan.” Exhibit F, Tab 1, Schedule 1, OPA (2007).
2 Under the system that has been implemented, the OPA owns the contractual right to capacity and other electricity products.
3 OPA Business Plan (2007). 
4 OPA Business Plan (2007).
5 See Review Panel Phase 2 Report on Ontario Electricity Agencies (December 20, 2007). It should be noted that the Panel did not have an
explicit mandate to “contemplate privatization, nor any changes to the current hybrid market structure in Ontario.”
6 For further detail, see Hunt (2001).| 2 Commentary 261
with fluctuations in fuel prices, technological
change or plant breakdowns — should be
distributed to the lowest-cost bearer of such risks.
The most efficient way of achieving these goals
would be to address the failures that have caused
underinvestment, both by remedying structural
and institutional failures and by rethinking price
controls. In this paper, I analyze these failures and
provide recommendations for improving the
functioning of Ontario’s electricity sector by
reducing and eventually eliminating reliance on
central procurement.
The key factors which have led to
underinvestment are: (i) the lack of viable
counterparties to whom generators can sell their
product on a long-term basis; (ii) poor
accountability at Ontario Power Generation
(OPG), which owns and operates the province’s
electricity generation once held by the former
Ontario Hydro; (iii) OPG’s continued public
ownership of key facilities, and (iv) political
intervention in prices.
This paper’s recommendations to address these
problems are that:
￿ Public-sector actors, including the
government and the OPA, should
continue and expand efforts to ensure that
there are entities other than a public body
with whom prospective new generation
investors can contract on a long-term
basis. For example, the government
should embrace the OPA’s calls for
establishing load-serving entities.
￿ The government should recognize explicitly
that OPA’s central procurement function is
transitional and that one of its main
objectives is to help the sector migrate to a
more competitive market environment.
￿ The government must persist with efforts
to improve governance at OPG, including
clarifying OPG’s mission. It should
consider the privatization, by sale or lease,
of OPG assets and/or allow OPG to
obtain a market-level return on equity.
￿ To further ensure good governance and
accountability, the government should
establish clear performance objectives and
criteria for the agency responsible for
power procurement (be it the OPA or its
successors).
￿ The government should embrace the
principle of technological neutrality in its
dealings with the OPA and the OPG.
Moving to lower-emitting power sources
should be achieved through
environmental regulation (such as a cap-
and-trade system) rather than through
ministerial directives.
Background: The Emergence of the
“Hybrid” Sector Structure
The Government of Ontario has been deeply
involved in the electricity sector for more than a
century. It established public ownership over
nearly all transmission and generation facilities in
the early 1900s. Government involvement has
been driven by the large economies of scale in
electricity production, particularly the fossil fuel,
nuclear and hydroelectricity plants operated by
Ontario Hydro.
In the mid-1990s, the province began the
process of introducing wholesale competition to
Ontario Hydro’s near monopoly on generation
and transmission. At the time, Ontario Hydro
had experienced significant cost increases, notably
in relation to the Darlington nuclear facility,
which resulted in dramatic increases in electricity
prices to consumers.
In 1996, a provincial independent committee
recommended “reforms  . . . necessary to
introduce competition into Ontario’s electricity
system.” These reforms included termination of
Ontario Hydro’s near-monopoly control on
generation and establishing a “transmission
system open to all suppliers,” including private
sector generators (Macdonald Committee 1996).
Three factors spurred this reform: (i) loss of
trust in Ontario Hydro, especially its ability to
operate cost-effectively; (ii) technological changes
that decreased economies of scale in electricity
production, particularly the increased availability
of efficient, natural-gas fired turbines; and (iii) the
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success of wholesale market competition in US
jurisdictions as well as in England and Wales.
Following the Macdonald Committee report,
the government split Ontario Hydro into two
main entities: OPG, which would own the
generation assets, and Hydro One, which would
own the high-voltage transmission lines and some
distribution assets. As well, the province set about
making the regulatory reforms and developing the
institutions needed to facilitate the development
of competitive wholesale and retail markets. It
constructed a wholesale market in which
generators operated and supplied electricity to
buyers based on a spot price set every five
minutes. The varying spot price was based on
constantly changing demand and supply
conditions.7
One of the long-term tenets of a competitive
wholesale electrical market is that generators
compete to determine which supplier can deliver
power at the lowest cost. The government created
an agency independent of OPG, the Independent
Electricity Market Operator (IMO), to oversee
the market’s operation, including selecting which
generators would supply what quantities of
power.8 To deter OPG from abusing its market
power, the government instituted a market power
mitigation agreement (MPMA) requiring it to
rebate to consumers its revenue above certain
thresholds. Under the MPMA, OPG was also
required to divest the majority of its facilities
within fixed time periods.
Finally, the government introduced
competition for electricity sales to end-consumers.
Private-sector electricity retailers were allowed to
compete with (primarily municipally owned) local
distribution companies to sell power to retail
consumers.9 Low-volume retail consumers were to
be exposed to the spot price of electricity either
on a month-to-month basis, quarterly or yearly,
through a “true-up” mechanism.10
Wholesale and retail competition began
simultaneously on May 1, 2002, two years behind
schedule. The new pricing method lost the
support of both consumers and the government
during its first six months of operation. Several
factors, including extreme heat and the
unavailability of some key Ontario generation
facilities, pushed the cost of power to unusually
high levels in the summer of 2002. In response to
mounting criticism of the high summer electricity
prices from consumers, the government froze
retail prices at 4.3 cents per kilowatt hour, the
price that consumers had been paying before the
market launched (Hrab and Trebilcock 2007).
The Current Sector Structure
The “hybrid” of Regulation and the Market 
Responding to the failure of the preceding regime
to stimulate new investment in power generation,
the new provincial Liberal government elected in
October 2003 made significant changes to the
electricity sector. The new approach preserved
elements of the competitive market that the
previous government had created but placed
greater limits on the market’s scope and more
emphasis on regulation.
Reducing the amount of competition, the
government retained the wholesale spot market
but limited the amount of generation that would
participate in it. It removed OPG’s baseload
hydroelectric and nuclear generation — 40
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7 Ibid.
8 This selection process is commonly known as “dispatch.”
9 Even if a local distribution company owned the distribution network, a private-sector retailer could in theory compete and profit by
obtaining contracts to sell power at lower prices or by offering different contract terms to consumers.
10 The Ontario Energy Board in a 1999 decision gave local distribution companies two options with respect to low-volume consumers: to sell
at the spot price or at 4.3 cents/kWh with periodic true-ups. The Board found that: “On balance, small volume/residential consumers [i.e.,
users with peak demand of 50 kW or less] should receive a ‘fixed’ one-year price for SSS [Standard Supply Service] with annual 'true-ups'
to reflect the actual average spot market price as a component of the next-year fixed price. Large-volume consumers [i.e., peak demand
greater than 50 kW] should receive a spot price pass-through.” However, the Board also decided that, “Any distributor when filing its SSS
rate proposals may make application for an exemption to the fixed price SSS in favour of a spot price, pass-through rate for small
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percent of Ontario’s installed capacity — from
competitive spot market pricing and fixed the
price at which this power could be sold. In
addition, it capped the effective price at which
OPG could sell power from its other assets (Hrab
and Trebilcock 2007).
The government abandoned the requirement
that OPG sell off large portions of its assets to the
private sector. The latter measure removed the
prospect of such generation eventually
participating in the spot market in the near
future. Since nearly three-quarters of all electrical
generation remained in public hands and was
priced at levels independent of the spot market,
the government essentially ended wholesale power
competition (Dewees 2005).
Furthermore, the government introduced a
heightened degree of regulation to restrain retail
prices from the vagaries of the market. Although
it removed the retail price freeze implemented in
November 2002, the government dampened retail
prices by regulating the price that OPG would
receive for its power at the wholesale level. Instead
of allowing prices to fluctuate month-to-month,
depending on spot prices, the government
mandated that retail prices be regulated on a
yearly basis by the Ontario Energy Board so as to
reflect the wholesale costs of electricity produced
during the previous year.
Retail competition persisted to the extent that
consumers continued to purchase fixed-price
contracts for power from private power retailers,
as had been the case under the 2002 regime
(Hrab and Trebilcock 2007).11
The new government also imposed more
regulation and central planning on the
institutions and agencies active in the electricity
sector. The newly established OPA had a mandate
not only to procure new generation but also to
centrally plan the system through developing an
“Integrated Power System Plan” and conservation
efforts. The government renamed the agency
designed to operate the electricity system to the
Independent Electricity System Operator from
the Independent Electricity Market Operator. 
It also enhanced the role of the OEB, the sector
regulator. The OEB received mandates to oversee
the retail pricing of electricity for residential
customers and, beginning in April 2008, the
wholesale pricing of OPG’s regulated generation.
Further, it received authority to oversee the
Ontario Power Authority by “licensing” it,
reviewing its budget and reviewing its Integrated
Power System Plan and procurement processes.12
The Reasons for Underinvestment
and the Resort to Central
Procurement
The Failure of the Pre-2004 Market 
to Ensure New Investment
The government’s resort to central procurement
was essentially a response to underinvestment in
new generation under the pre-2004 regime.
Before 2004, proponents of a competitive market
believed that it would produce investment in
“adequate generating plant in the long run, and
even in the short run” (Hunt 2001). In practice,
the Ontario wholesale market did not ensure new
generation investment sufficient to meet growing
demand, even if it stimulated limited investment
in new gas-fired generation capacity. The OPA
noted in 2006 that there was a significant
“shortage of local generation” in the greater
Toronto area in particular.13
SHORT-TERM FACTORS: The competitive
wholesale market failed to stimulate new
generation investment partly due to short-term,
C.D. Howe Institute
11 The OEB refers to this as the “Regulated Price Plan.” The RPP, which has gone through multiple iterations, currently sets a price of 5.5 per
kWh for consumption below and 6.4 cents per kWh for consumption above a certain threshold. Differences between the revenue received
through the regulated rate and the actual costs of wholesale power during the previous year are credited to or recovered from ratepayers
through a “variance account.” See OEB, “Regulated price plan manual” (March 11, 2005) and OEB, “Monthly variance explanation”
(February 22, 2007).
12 Ontario Energy Board Act S.O.1998 c.15, s.57.
13 “Ontario’s Integrated Power System Plan Discussion Paper 5: Transmission.” OPA (2006).Commentary 261 | 5
idiosyncratic factors. The Ontario market opening
occurred in the wake of the Enron bankruptcy
that reduced the availability of credit to private-
sector generators. This made it difficult for
generators to respond to rising Ontario spot
prices by building new generation capacity.
As an alternative to relying on the spot market
to recover their capital costs, many generators
wished to establish long-term contracts to sell
their power to wholesale buyers. Such contracts
would provide price certainty for the sellers.
However, generators’ low-credit ratings made
them unattractive counterparties, thereby
impairing the emergence of a liquid, long-term
contracting market.
At root, however, the wholesale market’s failure
to stimulate new investment was a manifestation
of problems in the Ontario energy sector agencies’
structure and institutions. Specifically, three forces
combined to restrict investment: institutional
factors, political influence and public ownership.
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS: I have mentioned the
lack of viable purchasers to whom generators
could contract to sell their power on a medium-
or long-term basis. In successful competitive
wholesale markets, such as New England and
England and Wales, long-term and medium-term
contracts have played an important role. In New
England, approximately three-quarters of trading
is in the form of bilateral contracts (ongoing
contracts between generators and wholesale
buyers) and only one-quarter is in the real-time
spot market.14
The main reason that a system of long- and
medium-term contracting for power (as opposed
to a real-time spot market) failed to emerge in
Ontario was that the sector structure unveiled in
2002 lacked creditworthy counterparties willing
to act as buyers in long-term contracts.15 In
particular, the sector structure failed to provide
for “load-serving entities” (LSEs) and/or a
restructuring of Ontario’s numerous local
distribution companies to fulfill this function. A
load-serving entity acts as an intermediary
between loads (clusters of electricity demand,
such as a municipality) and the wholesale
marketplace, taking the responsibilities and risks
of serving the loads.16
LSEs are often active in buying and/or selling
electricity in a forward market or through
contracts to procure energy in the future.17 LSEs
can enable long-term contracting by acting as
creditworthy counterparties. But Ontario Energy
Board rules made it prohibitive for Local
Distribution Companies (LDCs) to enter into
long-term power purchase contracts.
POLITICAL INFLUENCE: The second cause of
underinvestment was that the government found
it acceptable, straightforward and appropriate to
directly intervene in energy prices for political
reasons. During the summer of 2002, some retail
consumers faced higher electricity prices, while
others anticipated them in 2003 as part of a
“true-up” mechanism triggered by 2002’s higher
wholesale prices. Pressure from the public and the
media eventually led the government to announce
that retail prices for low-volume consumers would
be frozen. The difference between the wholesale
market spot price and the frozen retail price
would be paid by the Ontario Electricity
Financial Corporation, yet another new
government-owned entity, established in part to
manage the debt of the former Ontario Hydro.
The government’s control of energy prices
discouraged generation investment. In Ontario’s
market structure, generators received the market-
clearing price in the spot market for the energy
they sold into the grid. The difference between
the market-clearing price and generators’ marginal
costs would, in theory, allow generators to recover
their capital costs.
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14 See “About Wholesale Electricity Trading.” Available at http://www.iso-ne.com/nwsiss/grid_mkts/how_mkts_wrk/whlsle_elec_trad/index.
15 As used in this paper, “creditworthiness” refers to an entity’s financial soundness, including its credit rating, which is an important factor in
making it an attractive counterparty in electricity contracts.
16 See “Reducing Reliance on Central Procurement.” OPA Integrated Power System Plan, Exhibit F, Tab 2 (2007).
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However, the government’s interventions in
retail prices made generators concerned that the
province might eventually prevent wholesale
prices from being sufficiently high enough to
recover their capital costs. Potential investors
feared that the government would lose
enthusiasm for subsidizing the difference between
the wholesale spot price and the 4.3 cents per
kilowatt hour retail price. Due to this danger,
potential generators generally refrained from
investing in Ontario electrical power production,
absent an explicit price guarantee (Dewees 2005).
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP: The failure of the pre-2004
market to stimulate new investment can also be
attributed to a Crown corporation’s continued
ownership of the majority of generation assets. By
not making its facilities available for private sector
investment, OPG prevented private investment
from expanding them or converting them to new
generation types, such as from coal to natural gas.
OPG also did not make available its rights over
certain sites, such as rivers whose hydropower
could be developed by the private sector.
Moreover, OPG was “not well run” in
managing these facilities (Manley 2004). Its
inefficiencies contributed at least partially to the
unavailability of key OPG-operated nuclear
facilities in the summer of 2002 and the price
spikes triggering direct political control over retail
prices in November 2002.18
Problems with Central Procurement:
A Comparative Perspective
In its 2004/2005 reforms, the government created
the OPA to solve the problems that had led to
underinvestment. In particular, the government
believed this new body would provide investors
with a long-sought, creditworthy counterparty for
long-term contracts, thereby stimulating new
generation investment. At least in the initial
period, the OPA was expected to contract with
private generators — rather than OPG — for
new generation capacity.
It is true that over the short-term, central
procurement is likely to secure more steel in the
ground. The OPA has the legal characteristics and
financial mechanisms necessary to be a
creditworthy counterparty, with enabling
legislation providing the power to impose the cost
of its procurement contracts on ratepayers.19
The OPA has already demonstrated a track
record of stimulating significantly more new
generation investment than did the spot market
in the pre-2004 period. Most of the OPA’s
procurement processes (including requests for
proposals) thus far have attracted significant
numbers of proposals. While less than 2,200
megawatts of new projects were constructed
during the 2000-2003 period, the OPA in the
2005-2007 period signed contracts for more than
8,000 megawatts of new generation. Meanwhile,
firms interested in participating in anticipated
future OPA procurements are investing large
amounts of money in developing their project
plans and purchasing sites.
Nevertheless, central procurement by a single
purchasing agency is not the best long-term
approach to remedying power generation
underinvestment. Even if it secures investment in
the short run, this approach ought to be used
only as a means of transitioning to other
mechanisms for stimulating generation
investment.
Typically, other jurisdictions adopt single-buyer
central procurement as a transitional step to a
competitive market and/or an emergency
measure. Indeed, central procurement is
comparatively expensive and typically results in
the purchaser paying contract prices above spot
market prices and allocates most market and
technology risk to ratepayers.
18 OPG Review Committee, supra.
19 Although the OPA’s obligations are not explicitly guaranteed by the province, it has been given power in the Electricity Act to “establish
and impose fees and charges to recover the costs of doing anything the OPA is required or permitted to do under this or any other Act.”
The Electricity Act specifically states that, “For greater certainty, the OPA may, subject to the regulations, establish and impose charges to
recover from consumers its costs and payments under procurement contracts.”Commentary 261 | 7
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In emerging markets with a history of state-
owned generation, central procurement through a
single purchasing agency is usually implemented
as an intermediate step in constructing
competitive markets. In particular, central
procurement is often employed to spur private
investment where generators perceive investment
risks to be high.
A market structure based on long-term
contracts allocates credit risk to the buyer and
ultimately to ratepayers or taxpayers.20 But long-
term contracts shelter sellers from the credit risks
often associated with non-state purchasers in
developing countries: single-purchaser buyers are
typically agencies that are state-owned and hence
(generally) good credit risks. Sheltering generators
from these risks helps stimulate capital investment
by private-sector generation investors (Hunt
2001).
For example, South Korea’s former state-owned
monopoly generator, KEPCO, acted as a single
purchaser as the first phase in the country’s shift
to a competitive market in the early 2000s. The
second phase involved greater wholesale
competition (Byrne 2004). Central procurement
has also been used as a mechanism for stimulating
the development of independent power producers
in China (Chun 2005).21
But central procurement by a single entity has
been used sparingly in developed countries that
have restructured their electricity markets since
the 1990s. In the instances where it has been
employed in developed countries, centralized
procurement as defined above is generally used as
a transitional, limited or tightly regulated
measure.
Portugal’s Public Electricity System, for one,
introduced long-term contracts as a way of
stimulating the growth of Portuguese independent
power producers ahead of the emergence of a
competitive Iberian power market to be
developed jointly with Spain (IEA 2004).
Meanwhile, in certain US states, government-
owned power authorities own a relatively small
amount of power capacity that is used to supply
the power needs of the broader public sector and
industries that government wishes to subsidize.22
Central procurement has also been used as an
emergency measure to prevent imminent supply
disruptions in jurisdictions with competitive
wholesale markets. California used central
procurement as a last-resort to ensure that
generators maintained operations and new
construction amidst a collapse of creditworthiness
among buyers and other market challenges in
2001. The US federal government’s refusal to use
its authority to force generators to “keep
supplying electricity without assurances that they
would be paid” made it “clear that if the State of
California did not take action, the lights would
go out as suppliers refused to generate electricity
unless they were assured of adequate payments by
a creditworthy entity”.23
To protect against that eventuality, the California
Department of Water Resources signed 10-year
power purchase contracts worth approximately $43
billion. The state’s primary motivations were “to
provide incentives to generators to make their
plants available to supply electricity” and “to
facilitate completion of new . . . plants” in this
unusual context (Joskow 2001).
The Illinois Power Authority, which has a
mandate to engage in central procurement,
appears set to purchase electricity using shorter-
term contracts and in a significantly more
regulated fashion than the OPA. “The IPA will
periodically seek bids for electricity from
generators such as Exelon, Ameren, Midwest
Generation and others” and “then negotiate for
the lowest possible prices for residential
20 Credit risk in the electricity context is the risk that the counterparty will not perform his obligations or pay damages, including inability
due to financial failure or insolvency. See Hunt (2001).
21 The Chinese State Council is the supreme executive organ of state power in China.
22 See, for example, the New York Power Authority.
23 “California’s Electricity Crisis.” Paul Joskow, Paper, MIT, September 28, 2001.| 8 Commentary 261
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consumers.”24 Thus far, prior to IPA’s formal
establishment, Illinois has delegated the IPA’s
responsibilities to its predecessor, which appears
to be signing five-year contracts, in contrast to the
OPA’s 20-year standard. Moreover, the IPA must
seek approval of the state legislature for all
contracts worth more than $1 billion, and its
acceptance of specific bids is at the authority of
an external state agency.25
There are two main reasons jurisdictions are
reluctant to use centralized procurement, except
as a short-term or limited measure. First, such
procurement allocates risk unfavorably and,
second, it is relatively expensive from the buyer’s
standpoint. Centralized procurement normally
results in all or most of the
market, technology and credit
risk being shifted to the buyer
and ultimately to ratepayers.
Long-term contracts also




contracts through a single
purchaser provide generators
with shelter from significant
risks, such as market prices dropping due to
decreases in demand, or their product becoming
uncompetitive because of technological
improvements in alternative generation. If the
market prices that subsequently materialize are
significantly lower than expected, it is the buyer
and not the seller who bears most (or, in the cases
of some contract structures, all) of the effective
cost. In addition, buyers in long-term contracts
frequently assume significant credit risks, since
private generation investors frequently possess
low- or medium-grade credit ratings (Hunt
2005).26
Central procurement contracts in practice
frequently result in buyers paying prices
significantly exceeding spot market prices, in spite
of the fact that buyers bear the risks just
discussed. California’s contracts, for example, were
struck at above-market levels (Joskow 2001). This
phenomenon can be partially attributed to the
fact that buyers in central procurement markets
may be very eager to ensure that new capacity is
built in the near term (Green 1999). Where
buyers are extremely eager to build new facilities,
suppliers can exert a substantial premium for
agreeing to do so.
These problems also present themselves in
Ontario. Many of the OPA’s contracts result in a
significant amount of market and technology
risks being borne by the OPA and, indirectly,
Ontario ratepayers. Most of the
2005/2006 contracts for new
natural gas capacity gave
generators a right to support
payments covering their fixed
costs (and other payments
covering certain aspects of their
variable costs) regardless of the
future direction of spot market
prices.27 In addition, generators
receive payments even if future
competing technologies make
their product uneconomic.
It is unclear whether recent OPA procurement
contracts will in the long run be expensive relative
to future spot market prices, as has proven to be
the case in California. Many projects under OPA
contracts incorporated rates of return on equity
comparable with industry norms. OPA CEO Jan
Carr suggests that the authority’s contracts will
provide generators with payments designed to
cover only their capital costs and will shift risk to
ratepayers only “to the extent necessary to make
investment feasible” (Carr 2005).
However, anecdotal evidence suggests such
contracts may be overly priced to the benefit of
generators. A former Ontario deputy minister of
24 “Illinois back in power market; electricity experiment will be watched closely.” Chicago Tribune (July 29, 2007) and Illinois Public Act 095-
0481 (2007).
25 See Chicago Tribune, supra.
26 Hunt, supra.
27 These contracts are known as Clean Energy Supply (CES) contracts.
Many of the OPA’s
contracts result in a
significant amount of
market and technology
risks being borne by the
OPA and, indirectly,
Ontario ratepayers.energy involved in the 2003/2004 procurements
has suggested that generators were able to extract
a premium for agreeing to construct new
generation when the government was desperate to
ensure adequate power supplies:
What has the government’s policy-
induced crisis wrought? It has led to . . .
the Ontario Power Authority entering
into numerous deals to secure
replacement generation . . . in order to
rush ahead with new generation to deal
with the self-inflicted crisis. In this
instance . . . everyone on the other side of
the deal knows the government is in panic
mode.” (Purchase, 2007).
Even assuming that the OPA manages to mitigate
the related cost-effectiveness problems that have
plagued other jurisdictions, there are other
compelling reasons why central procurement
ought, at best, be a transitional measure. First,
central procurement affords an avenue for
political factors to intrude on generators’
investment decisions and thereby produce
inefficient decisions.28 In a well-functioning,
competitive, wholesale market, private investors
make investment decisions based primarily on
market information, even if they indirectly take
into account political preferences for locations
and technologies. Competitive wholesale markets
“overcome highly politicized processes of
investment” (Hunt 2001).
In contrast, central procurement places the
choices of when, where and what to build largely
in the hands of central planners (Hunt 2001)
who may base their plans on government-set,
politically influenced parameters. The current
Liberal government has used its legislative powers
to mandate that OPA planners include and ignore
certain technology choices.29 These measures may
arguably be promoting inefficient decisions
regarding generation technology (Purchase 2007).
Moreover, Ontario electricity’s system currently
bears the cost of administering both a wholesale
market and a procurement-based system. Unlike
the developing countries earlier discussed,
Ontario has already made the substantial
investments associated with developing and
operating a market, including the IESO computer
models, facilities and human resources. Central
procurement adds to such burdens the ongoing
costs associated with running the bureaucracy,
including the OPA, necessary to oversee
procurement.
Reducing the role of procurement would
reduce the high overhead costs associated with
running this hybrid system. Such costs are
substantial: the OPA and IESO operating budgets
total more than $190 million annually.30 Folding
the OPA’s procurement function into the IESO,
as recommended by the 2007 Review Panel on
the province’s electricity agencies, would reduce,
but not eliminate this cost.
In the near term, central procurement is likely
to achieve more generation investment than did
the pre-2004 competitive wholesale market. In
the long run, however, Ontario should seek to
reduce its reliance on this method of stimulating
generation investment. Central procurement
results in questionable cost-effectiveness and
allocates risk in ways unfavourable to ratepayers.
These problems are compounded by the
opportunities for political intervention in
investment decisions and the high administrative
costs.
An Alternative to Relying on Central
Procurement
The alternative to central procurement is to rely
on a competitive wholesale market — including
long-term contracts — to promote new
investment. Counting on a competitive wholesale
market to stimulate new investment will require
addressing the root causes of underinvestment in
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the pre-2004 market. As noted above, these were:
the absence of creditworthy counterparties for
new generation, continued state ownership of
generation assets and poor governance (at OPG),
along with political control of energy prices.
Fostering Creditworthy Purchasers for Long-
Term Contracts
Disengaging the central procurement function of
the OPA (or its successors) will require fostering
creditworthy purchasers for long-term contracts.
The government and public sector actors could
achieve this by enabling intermediaries to buy
power in the form of long-term contracts and
then resell such power to consumers, or resell
power to other entities that would then resell
power to consumers. These types of
intermediaries, or “load serving entities,”31 would
provide counterparties willing and able to
contract with generators to buy their power on a
long-term basis.32
The government and the OEB could also
consider giving Local Distribution Companies the
mandate and ability to engage in long-term
contracting.33 For example, the OPA or
government could provide that LDCs must have
adequate contracted provision of capacity reserves
to meet their projected peak load requirements
(Oren 2005).
Even if LDCs were so mandated, intermediaries
such as LSEs would still have a role. An
individual LDC, or even a group of LDCs, might
not wish to contract for large blocks of a given
plant’s long-term capacity, partly due to the risk
that its customers might at some point flee to
retailers. In such a case, an LSE could buy such
power and resell it in smaller blocks on shorter
terms to LDCs to meet their near-term
requirements.34 LSEs could also assist LDCs in
hedging their risks in forward markets.
In combination with fostering the growth of
LSEs, the government should embrace the OPA’s
efforts, such as its cooperation with the Natural
Gas Exchange (NGX), to develop a forward price
curve by facilitating forward auctions. These
auctions help generation developers and LSEs to
determine appropriate prices for future electricity
production.35
Ending the Provincial Ownership Stake
The government should immediately signal that
the OPA’s purchasing role, currently the subject
of substantial ambiguity, is transitional — OPA
CEO Jan Carr suggests that the authority should
be a “transitional agency” and will at some point
“do itself out of a job.” Reflecting this view, the
OPA’s 2007 business plan suggests that, “Over
time, as the market develops sufficient ability to
ensure timely investment in supply resources, the
need for OPA procurement activities will
decline.”36
However, there is significant uncertainty among
industry players about the OPA’s central
procurement mandate. Some express doubt that a
procurement bureaucracy would willingly “do it
itself out of a job.”
Under current regulations, the OPA is
mandated not to engage in procurement before
making an assessment of “the likelihood that
investment by other persons will meet the need
for electricity supply.” This sentiment should be
firmed up by amending the Electricity Act to place
a sunset clause on the OPA’s procurement
31 See OPA “2007 Business Plan” and “Ontario’s Evolving Electricity Sector.” Jan Carr presentation to APPro 19th Annual Power Conference,
Toronto, November 13, 2007.
32 These or similar types of entities have also been called “Customer Entitlement Agents.” See Carr, November 13, 2007, supra.
33 As discussed above, LDCs are currently required by the OEB to purchase their power from the spot market and precluded from entering
long-term contracts.
34 See Independent Power Producers’ Society of Ontario Final Argument, Ontario Energy Board, Standard Supply Service Code Proceeding,
OEB File No. RP-1999-0040. 
35 “Integrated Power System Plan.” OPA (2007).
36 OPA Business Plan 2007, supra.Commentary 261 | 11
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mandate, stipulating that such mandate be
reassessed periodically and, if necessary, modified. 
Establishing more Accountability
To address another cause of underinvestment, the
government must strengthen the governance of all
electricity-related public-sector bodies. Clearly,
the OPA must to some degree be independent of
government: the separation of procurement from
the core policymaking role of government
enhances the credibility of procurement efforts
with potential investors and can act as a check
against the government assisting political allies to
obtain contracts.
At the same time, there are compelling
arguments that independent agencies in the
energy sector should be accountable to
government. Accountability acts as a way of
controlling agency costs, of reining in the natural
inclination of bureaucracies to pursue their own
interests at the expense of the objectives of the
government and the public interest.
Bureaucrats sometimes seek to maximize their
budgets in order to further their job security,
remuneration or prestige. In the absence of
constraints, procurement bureaucrats may tend to
engage in more long term-contracting than is
necessary to help protect their jobs. Bureaucrats
might also be motivated to open contracts to
entities with which they might want to seek job
opportunities in the future.37
On paper, the OPA achieves a good balance
between independence and accountability. The
Electricity Act formally guards against undue
government influence by preserving independence
for the OPA in its internal operations and in
specific aspects of its procurements. Although the
government may constrain procurement decisions
by regulation, the minister of energy is given
power to direct particular procurement efforts
only until “the Board’s first approval of the OPA’s
procurement processes,” which will likely take
place in late 2008 or early 2009.38
The internal operations of the OPA are
effectively in the hands of the OPA board of
directors, removed from the minister’s formal
control. On the other hand, the Electricity Act
provides several formal mechanisms to ensure that
the OPA is accountable to government, such as
the requirement that the minister of energy
approve the OPA’s business plan. As well, the
independent OEB must approve the OPA budget
and review the OPA’s proposed procurement
processes.39
Nevertheless, in practice, these accountability
measures may prove insufficient. Even if the OEB
has a formal mandate to review and approve the
OPA budget, it is unclear that it has the tools for
effective review or what criteria should be used.
The OEB’s legislative mandate to assess “cost
effectiveness” and “economic prudence” are
restricted to the Integrated Power System Plan.
Clearly, the current mechanisms for monitoring
the OPA’s operations, budget and priorities and
addressing any perceived problems could be
significantly improved. The OPA lacks externally
imposed guidance on what constitute appropriate
performance criteria and targets although, in their
absence, the OPA has attempted to develop its
own criteria in its 2007 Business Plan. The result
is the unsastifactory situation where the OPA
could counter charges of poor performance by
referencing unclear performance criteria.
OPG’s inefficiencies and continued ownership
of key generation assets were important reasons
for the failure of the 2002 competitive wholesale
market. Since 2003, issues associated with the
governance of OPG continue to hold back
investment in new generation.
The Agency Review Panel noted that “OPG
continues to operate in an environment of
uncertainty” about what objectives it should be
pursuing. OPG has been given a mandate to
continue to hold its existing assets, but “it is not
37 Majone (1999).
38 Electricity Act, supra, s.25.4
39 Electricity Act, supra, s.25.31.| 12 Commentary 261
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clear whether or how OPG will be allowed [by
the government] to expand in future.” This
uncertainty may be “hobbling its ability to
operate as a commercial entity and generate
earnings adequate to support new investment.”
The current approach presents the double
disadvantages of (i) preventing OPG from using
its resources to invest in new generation, while (ii)
discouraging and restricting private sector
involvement in certain new generation. The latter
occurs because OPG continues to hold on to key
sites, preventing private developers from building
on or converting them, and “from the perspective
of other market participants, the possibility of
support from the Province can be seen as
providing OPG with an unfair advantage over
private-sector generators.”40
OPG’s inefficiencies and uncertainty of mission
are largely reflections of the special corporate
governance challenges presented by state
ownership. The market’s power to align the
interests of the owners and managers of state-
owned enterprises (SOE) is highly limited. The
objectives that SOE managers should be pursuing
are often blurred by government, which makes
monitoring managerial efficiency difficult.
Consequently, the government typically has less
ability to monitor management than owners of
private enterprises (Schleifer and Vishny 1997).
Managers are also often hindered in managing
effectively by political interference.41
Product market competition is extensive for
Ontario’s non-SOE generators due to the
operation of the hourly spot market and OPA
tendering processes that are designed to award
contracts to the lowest-cost bidders. In contrast,
OPG’s management is unfairly sheltered from the
effects of poor performance in the product
market.
The government did not permit OPG to go
bankrupt nor exact penalties on all but the most
senior OPG management in spite of its dire
performance over several years prior to 2003.42
On the contrary, the minister of energy took
measures to ensure that OPG would avoid
bankruptcy, announcing that the government
would guarantee and effectively assume a
significant portion of OPG’s growing debt load.
The government’s ability to monitor OPG
management is undermined by its tendency to
obscure OPG’s mission and performance and
intervene in its management. The 2004 Review
Committee on the future of the OPG suggested
that the authority’s performance be evaluated by
the type of criteria used to measure “commercial”
generators’ performance. This proposal has only
been superficially implemented.
The government’s control of the way OPG
creates power, and the prices it charges, make it
difficult to evaluate OPG’s performance on the
same basis as private generators. Government
setting of output prices inherently limits OPG’s
earnings by capping its revenues, the top line of a
profit calculation. As a result, managers can blame
poor profitability on the government’s revenue
limit. For example, in 2006, OPG’s earnings
declined by 25 percent. OPG’s financial
documents acknowledged the decline, but
suggested that, “Earnings in 2006 were
significantly affected by a reduction in gross
margin from electricity sales primarily due to
lower average sale prices.”
Moreover, it may be unclear whether OPG’s
lower cost efficiencies are due to poor
management or politically imposed obligations to
use less cost-efficient technologies that meet the
government’s environmental priorities.
The government must clarify OPG’s mission
and performance objectives, a critical prerequisite
for improving OPG’s governance and efficiency. It
should give OPG a mandate either to (i) expand
existing generation or (ii) sell or lease its sites to
the private sector. In the long term, the latter
option may represent the best means of
40 Agency Review Panel Phase II report, supra.
41 This is not an exhaustive list of the corporate governance challenges faced by state-owned enterprises.  Another important challenge is the
significant power of public sector workers.
42 OPG Review Committee, supra. Commentary 261 | 13
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encouraging greater accountability because it
would reduce the governance challenges
associated with state ownership.
Medium-term or short-term OPA contracts
with private developers proposing to purchase or
lease de-controlled OPG facilities could be used
to facilitate de-control. Such contracts would give
a private developer a guaranteed revenue stream
to offset the risks associated with committing to
make lease or interest payments to acquire rights
to the facility. The privatization of the Bruce
nuclear generating station was facilitated in this
way.
Although some might argue that allowing
private involvement in OPG assets exposes the
government to criticism that it made a bad deal,
it need not be so. The government has
successfully engaged in public-private partnerships
in healthcare infrastructure without attracting
widespread criticism. A majority of public
opinion is open to the idea of greater public-
private partnerships in electricity generation.43
The inefficiencies associated with keeping OPG’s
infrastructure in its current state offer a powerful
argument for taking a new course.
Ending Political Interference
If the government decides to keep OPG’s assets in
public hands, it must ensure that the prices at
which OPG’s energy is sold are based primarily
on market forces rather than political
considerations. As discussed above, the
government currently regulates the price of
OPG’s hydro and nuclear generation and sets an
upper revenue limit on OPG’s unregulated
generation as a mechanism for dampening retail
prices. The return on equity that the government
allows OPG is currently well below industry
norms, resulting ultimately in lower consumer
electricity prices.44
Controlling OPG’s output prices in this fashion
risks prolonging the institutional problems that
led to underinvestment in several ways. First,
when OPG is permitted only a below-market
return on equity, it becomes difficult to monitor
the company’s performance. Is its sub-industry
financial performance due to poor cost
efficiencies or to its capped revenue and limited
ability to make capital expenditures?
Second, controlling OPG prices may create the
perception among potential investors that the
government is open to manipulating prices and
thereby expropriating private-sector generators’
investment and rents. In an environment where a
private-sector entity invests and “the other party,
the government, has strong incentives to behave
opportunistically,” governance “becomes crucial
to motivate the operator to invest and to restrain
the opportunistic behavior of the government”
(Holburn and Spiller 2002).
Third, to the extent OPG maintains a mandate
to operate key facilities, OPG’s artificially
depressed wholesale prices prolong the process of
keeping OPG assets out of the hands of potential
private-sector investors. By capping the price at
which OPG can sell its baseload power into the
market, the government is restricting incentives
for private generators to build baseload facilities.
The result is that developers will concentrate on
facilities designed to supply loads at peak times
even if this is not consistent with the needs of the
system.
To remedy this situation, the government must
stop controlling the price at which OPG sells its
power for political ends. The fact that the OEB
will have begun to set the prices OPG receives for
its nuclear and hydroelectric power as of mid-
2008 is a positive step in this regard. However,
the government ought to make clear that the
OEB will not be subject to political
considerations in its rate-regulating function.
43 See Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships. “Trends in Canadian Support for Public-Private Partnerships.” (2006).
44 Ministry of Energy News Release, (February 9, 2006). In 2003, the government began regulating the price at which OPG’s baseload
nuclear and hydroelectricity power would be sold. In addition, the government capped the effective price at which OPG could sell power
into the spot market from its other assets, which constitute 33 percent of Ontario’s installed capacity. See Hrab and Trebilcock (2007). The
costs incorporated into regulated retail rates reflect not only the costs of private-sector generation sold through the spot market, but also the
price of generation produced by OPG at government-set prices.| 14 Commentary 261
Under present legislation, the government may
tell the OEB to use specific methodologies and
assumptions in selecting OPG’s rate of return.45
If the government does prescribe specific
methodologies or assumptions, it should allow
OPG to achieve a market-level return on equity.
This approach would entail increased prices for
consumers but reduce the current barriers to
investment and corporate governance. 
Insofar as it intervenes in OPG affairs or OPA
procurements, the government should clarify its
commitment to the principle of technological
neutrality. Ensuring that Ontario moves towards
lower-emitting sources of supply is a valid policy
goal. However, environmental regulation should
be done explicitly as environmental regulation
rather than in the guise of electricity policy.
Market mechanisms — such as cap-and-trade
systems and carbon taxes — could help stimulate
generators to use lower-emitting technologies.
In contrast, ministerial directives to prescribe
generation technologies in central procurements
represent an inappropriate mechanism. Although
the government, on paper, exercises little direct
control over procurement, the technological
characteristics of generation is, in practice, driven
largely by ministerial directives.
Although the OPA controls the specific terms
of procurements, such procurements must be
made “in accordance with its approved integrated
power system plans” (IPSPs).46 In turn, the
legislation specifically provides that the IPSPs
must reflect any ministerial “directives . . . that set
out . . . goals relating to . . . the production of
electricity from . . . particular generation
technologies.”47 Similarly, the government has on
occasion used ministerial directives to direct the
OPG to employ certain technologies over others.
In theory, ministerial directives can be an
appropriate tool for achieving accountability by
public agencies. Ex ante “binding policy directives
may be a more desirable accountability
mechanism than ex-post Cabinet appeals” where
they are made following an open, analytical
process giving fair and due consideration to
different views (Janisch 1996). Janisch also
suggests “a public forum for formulating
directives.”
But it is unclear that ministerial directives are
appropriate tools for achieving accountability as
used in the case of the OPA.48 The technological
choices contained in the ministerial directives
thus far do not appear to be the result of an open,
analytical process. In early 2006, the minister did
conduct several informal town hall meetings and
solicited input from the OPA and some
stakeholders before issuing a directive prescribing
what supply mix the OPA should target in
summer 2006.49
Nevertheless, the government appeared to have
decided on the desired result before the process
began. In October 2005, news reports stated that
the minister of energy “offered an emphatic ‘no’
when asked whether he’d be willing to revisit the
Liberal government promise to stop burning
coal.” Moreover, the government had committed
itself to achieving certain levels of renewable
generation in 2004 before the consultation
process began.50
The use of ministerial directives to dictate
technological choice for political reasons is
worrisome for two reasons. First, the government
is picking winners with imperfect information as
to costs and characteristics. In selecting wind
power over a more traditional generation option,
for example, the government is picking the means
of achieving emissions reduction while ignoring
information about other options to reduce
emissions cost-effectively. As a well-respected
former deputy minister of energy put it: “By
C.D. Howe Institute
45 Ontario Energy Board Act S.0. 1998 c.15, s. 88; for political sensitivities on rate regulation, see Ontario Energy Board. “OEB Denies
Interim Payment Increase for OPG Regulated Prices.” Press Release. Feb. 8, 2008.
46 Electricity Act, supra, s.25.31.
47 Ibid.
48 See ministerial directives of June 2006 regarding supply mix, which prescribed certain generation technologies, as discussed in Part I. 
49 Dwight Duncan speech to Toronto Board of Trade (April 3, 2006).
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demonizing coal, and otherwise politicizing
energy technology and fuel choices, the premier,
minister of energy and their political advisers
made a fundamental error in public policy”
(Purchase 2007).
The ministerial directive model could become a
more appropriate tool for achieving accountability
in three ways. First, the government should be
cognizant of the need to employ a neutral, open
and objective process for formulating its directives
regarding integrated power system plans (IPSPs).
For example, government should avoid staking
out specific positions on technological choice
prior to hearing the views of stakeholders.
Although technological choice may inevitably
become an issue in public debate, the government
need not commit itself to one side before hearing
all views.
Second, the government could give the OPA
and OPG, to the extent that it remains state-
owned, more control over choice of generation
technology. Such a development would not
require legislative change. The Electricity Act
merely gives the minister power to prescribe
“generation technologies”; it does not require it.
Instead, the government could simply tell the
OPA to select a generation method that achieves
certain output characteristics (such as baseload,
intermediate or peaking generation), reliability
levels and costs. The government could also
specify that the generation the OPA selects must
achieve specific levels of carbon emissions
reduction. The OPA would then decide,
considering all technological options, which one
meets these requirements.
Some may suggest that reducing government
influence over Ontario’s electricity prices and
technology choices is unachievable, given the
importance of electricity production to Ontario’s
economy and environment. My response to this
criticism is twofold. First, this paper is not
recommending removing all government
influence over technology choice: it is merely
recommending that such influence be channeled
through environmental regulation rather than
through direct influence over Crown corporations
and ministerial directives. This recommendation
is consistent with academic writing suggesting
that technological change is best stimulated
through market-based initiatives, such as carbon
caps or a cap-and-trade system.
Second, other jurisdictions have successfully
found ways of mitigating direct government
influence over wholesale electricity prices, even if
not eliminating such influence altogether. The US
regulatory system, for one, restricts the ability of
state politicians with power over electricity policy
to influence wholesale electricity prices. It vests
certain powers in the board of the independent
system operator, the federal-level agency
responsible for oversight of energy decisions.51
And the courts sometimes have the power of
judicial review of administrative decisions relating
to wholesale price levels (as is the case in
Ontario).52
Although state Public Utilities Commission
members may be government appointed, a state
government typically exerts less influence over its
Public Utilities Commission than does the
Ontario government over the OEB and the OPA.
Because these commissions have fewer incentives
than state-level politicians to favour consumers’
interests over generators’ interests, they provide
checks and balances on the influence of state
politicians.53 The removal of technology choice
from the hands of politicians has not caused
public outcry in these jurisdictions.
Conclusion
Building a well-functioning electricity sector
requires that the institutional factors that led to
chronic underinvestment be addressed. While
central procurement will help Ontario meet the
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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needs for more generation investment in the short
run, it is questionable that it is the best
mechanism of achieving a well-functioning
electricity sector in the long run. Meanwhile,
central procurement in other jurisdictions has
resulted in buyers paying prices significantly
exceeding spot market prices, in spite of the fact
that buyers bear technology, market and credit
risks.
A summary follows of recommendations for
government and public-sector bodies to achieve
Ontario’s energy supply needs within the next few
years:
(i) There must be counterparties other than
the OPA to whom generators can sell
their production on a long-term basis. For
example, the government should embrace
the OPA’s calls for establishing load-
serving entities or Customer Entitlement
Agents.
(ii) The government should recognize
explicitly that the OPA’s central
procurement mission is transitional and
intended to help the sector migrate to a
more competitive market environment.
(iii)Governance must be improved at OPG by
making its assets available to the private
sector. To ensure good governance and
accountability at the agency responsible
for procurement (be it the OPA or its
successors), the government should
establish clear performance objectives and
criteria.
The government should embrace the principle
of technological neutrality insofar as it deals with
the OPA and the OPG. Moving to lower-
emitting power sources should be achieved
through environmental regulation, such as a cap-
and-trade system, rather than through ministerial
directives to the OPA and OPG.
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